Ritual Knowledge by Cuneo, Terence
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 31 Issue 4 Article 1 
10-1-2014 
Ritual Knowledge 
Terence Cuneo 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Cuneo, Terence (2014) "Ritual Knowledge," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers: Vol. 31 : Iss. 4 , Article 1. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol31/iss4/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative 
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
RITUAL KNOWLEDGE
Terence Cuneo
Most work in religious epistemology has concerned itself with propositional 
knowledge of God. In this essay, I explore the role of knowing how to engage 
God in the religious life. Specifically, I explore the role of knowing how to 
engage God in the context of ritualized liturgical activity, exploring the con-
tribution that knowing how to perform liturgical rites of various sorts can 
make to knowing God. The thesis I defend is that the liturgy provides both 
activities of certain kinds and conceptions of God such that knowing how to 
perform those activities under those conceptions is a species of what I call 
ritual knowledge.
Christian belief has faced and continues to face no shortage of challenges. 
Some challenges are broadly internal, generated by the Christian tradi-
tion itself. An example of such a challenge would be the controversy that 
animated the fourth-century discussion regarding what to believe of 
the person of Jesus. Other challenges, by contrast, are broadly external, 
typically generated not by the Christian tradition itself, but by those who 
stand outside of it. An example of such a challenge would be the charge 
that death cannot be due to human sin, as the Christian scriptures teach, 
since long before there were human beings who could sin, other animals 
suffered and died, often at remarkable rates.
The contemporary discussion of the epistemology of religious belief is 
driven by not an internal but an external challenge. While the challenge 
takes a variety of forms, each of its versions accuses religious belief of 
being epistemically defective in some way: irrational, unjustified, unwar-
ranted, or the like. Over the last twenty-five years, this challenge has met 
stiff resistance. According to the resisters, it is not religious belief that is 
defective but the challenge itself. For nearly always, the resisters maintain, 
the challenge incorporates a commitment to inflated or otherwise unac-
ceptable accounts of what epistemically meritorious beliefs would be. 
Given a more nearly adequate account of what such beliefs would be—so 
the resisters continue—we can see that religious beliefs can and often do 
exhibit epistemic merits such as being entitled, justified, warranted, and 
the like.1
1The most prominent work of the resisters includes William P. Alston, Perceiving God 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992); Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff, eds., 
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The project of responding to this external challenge strikes me as emi-
nently worthwhile. We have learned a great deal about what it is for beliefs 
to exhibit epistemic merits from it. But the project also carries risks. One 
such risk is that, in focusing almost exclusively on this external challenge 
to religious belief, philosophers have paid insufficient attention to both 
the variety and the roles of the religious attitudes, neglecting to ask ques-
tions about their character and purpose in the religious life. The result is 
often a lopsided picture of religious life “on the ground.”
Let me illustrate what I mean. In his book Warranted Christian Belief, 
Alvin Plantinga develops an account of religious belief-formation that he 
calls the Aquinas/Calvin or “A/C” model. According to the A/C model, we 
human beings are endowed with an array of epistemic faculties, among 
which is the sensus divinitatis or “sense of the divine.” Like our other in-
digenous epistemic faculties, the sensus divinitatis operates according to 
a design plan, which is itself calibrated to form true beliefs in congenial 
circumstances. When the sensus divinitatis operates according to its design 
plan in such circumstances, it yields warranted religious beliefs and, in-
deed, religious knowledge.
How does the sensus divinitatis yield such beliefs? According to the A/C 
model, it does so when various types of experiences occasion beliefs with 
theistic content. For example, when you or I contemplate the starry skies 
above, we might find ourselves forming the belief that God is the designer 
of the universe. Or, to enrich the model somewhat, when you or I hear the 
Gospel proclaimed, we might find ourselves forming the belief that Christ 
has atoned for the sins of humanity. What distinguishes beliefs of this last kind 
from beliefs of the former kind is not simply their distinctively Christian 
content. If Plantinga is right, these specifically Christian beliefs can also be 
viewed as having been evoked by divine action, what Plantinga calls (fol-
lowing Aquinas) the “internal instigation of the Holy Spirit.”2 Plantinga is 
quick to emphasize that all this is merely a model of religious-belief forma-
tion in the paradigmatic case. Still, he also maintains that were Christian 
theism true, it would be unsurprising if something close to the A/C model 
(in both its generic theistic and expanded Christian form) were to capture 
the way in which things actually go for many religious believers.3
Two features of the A/C model leap to the eye. The first is that human 
agency seems to play almost no role in the formation of warranted religious 
belief. When, for example, Plantinga presents cases in which ordinary 
people might form religious beliefs, these people hardly do anything. For 
Faith and Rationality (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983); Alvin Plant-
inga, Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Richard Swinburne, 
Faith and Reason, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); and Nicholas Wolter-
storff, Reason within the Bounds of Religion, 2nd edition (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1984) 
and Practices of Belief: Selected Essays, Volume 2, ed. Terence Cuneo (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010).
2Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, chaps. 8–9. 
3Ibid., 285.
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their beliefs to be formed, they need do only such things as look up into 
the starry sky above or hear the Gospel proclaimed, at least in congenial 
circumstances. At no point does the A/C model hint at the fact that, in the 
paradigmatic case, religious beliefs might be the fruit of extended effort, 
including engaging in those activities that are so often central to religious 
life, such as prayer, meditation, fasting, and what the Eastern Fathers call 
“watchfulness.”4 Nor, for that matter, does the model hint at the fact that 
these practical activities might play a crucial role in determining whether 
religious beliefs enjoy warrant. Warranted Christian Belief includes an entire 
chapter dedicated to the topic of the cognitive consequences of sin. Still, it 
never broaches the topic of whether engaging in the religious disciplines 
might be the very sort of activity that removes various impediments to 
(or abets) the proper working of the sensus divinitatis. As the A/C model 
presents things, these activities seem merely to be that which occasion the 
formation of warranted religious beliefs but not that which determine (even 
partially) whether these beliefs are warranted.
The second striking feature of the A/C model is that it presents the 
outputs of the sensus divinitatis as beliefs whose objects are propositions 
concerning God (or God’s activity), such as that God is the designer of the 
universe or that Christ has atoned for the sins of humanity. Plantinga develops 
the idea that, in the paradigmatic case, when these beliefs constitute re-
ligious faith, they are accompanied by conative states of various sorts, 
such as desiring and enjoying God’s presence. The paradigm case of re-
ligious faith, says Plantinga, is “sure and certain knowledge” of God that 
is “sealed to the heart . . . in the having of the right sorts of affections.”5 
Taken at face value, this formulation tells us that the role of the affections 
in faith is to cement or more deeply entrench the state of knowing various 
propositions about God.
I think we should find this striking. When, for example, the writer of 
Hebrews presents to the reader what it is to have faith, he presents what 
are not primarily reports regarding the mental lives of persons of faith 
but action narratives, stories of what these people have done. These nar-
ratives suggest that paradigmatic religious faith consists not merely or 
even primarily in a person’s being certain of propositions regarding God 
(or having certain affections that seal this knowledge) but rather in his 
being practically oriented toward the world in certain ways, such as being 
disposed to engage in acts of gratitude toward God.6
4See the section attributed to St. Hesychios the Priest (ca. eighth–ninth century) in G. E. H. 
Palmer, Philip Sherrard, and Kallistos Ware, The Philokalia, Vol. 1 (London: Faber and Faber. 
1979), 162.
5See Warranted Christian Belief, 291, 323.
6Although Plantinga comes close to entertaining a more expansive account of faith on 
page 293, it’s clear that his eye is on not the role of acting, but the role of the affections in 
faith: the “difference between believer and devil . . . lies in the area of affections” (ibid.). For 
reasons that will emerge later in this discussion, this seems to me incorrect. 
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My purpose in making these observations is, as I say, not to pour cold 
water on the contemporary discussion of the religious attitudes. Nor is it to 
suggest that the A/C model could not be amended to accommodate these 
observations. It is rather to illustrate the point that, by largely omitting 
the practical dimensions of the religious life, the contemporary discussion 
threatens to offer a distorted picture of the religious attitudes and, more 
generally, what it is to be a religious believer. Given the character of Chris-
tianity, it could not be otherwise. Christianity is not a body of propositions. 
Its fundamental aim is not to produce agents that form warranted beliefs 
about God. Nor is its aim to increase the likelihood that its adherents will 
have mystical experiences of God. Christianity is, rather, a way of life that 
is thoroughly practical. It is dedicated to engaging God in various ways by 
doing such things as blessing, petitioning, and thanking God—activities 
about which, I should add, philosophers have said virtually nothing.
Although the aim of the Christian way of life is practical, there is nev-
ertheless a perfectly good sense in which it aims to provide knowledge 
of God. But the knowledge in question, I suggest, is often not knowledge 
that one or another proposition regarding God is true but knowledge how 
to engage and live in communion with God. “If you wish to behold and 
commune with Him who is beyond sense perception and concept,” writes 
the fourth-century monastic Evagrios of Pontikos, then you must engage 
in such activities as prayer, singing the Psalms, giving alms, and engaging 
in the rites of the church.7 Under the approach that Evagrios advocates, 
knowing God is fundamentally a practical activity.
Appreciating this point about the practical aim of the Christian way 
of life, I believe, opens up new vistas in the epistemology of the religious 
attitudes. For it helps to bring together two sides of the Christian tradition 
that do not often meet in contemporary philosophical discussion. On the 
one hand is the insistence, which lies deep in the Christian tradition, that 
the Christian way of life includes as one of its central components ritual-
ized activity, such as participating in the liturgical actions of the church. 
Gregory of Nyssa voices this conviction when he writes that the power 
of Christianity resides not in its philosophical sophistication but in the 
“power of regeneration by faith” and the “participation in mystical sym-
bols and rites.”8 On the other hand is the conviction that a central aim 
of the Christian life is not to theorize about God but to know God. Were 
we to view knowing God as (in part) a species of practical knowledge, 
this would—or so I suggest—help us to see how these two sides of the 
Christian tradition fit together. It would allow us to see that knowing how 
to engage in ritualized activity is, when all goes well, a way in which we 
know God.
7The Philokalia, Vol. 1, 57. 
8Gregory of Nyssa, From Glory to Glory: Texts from Gregory of Nyssa’s Mystical Writings, 
selected and with an introduction by Jean Daniélou S. J. (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Semi-
nary Press, 1979), 18. 
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This last claim does not wear its meaning on its face, so let me unpack 
it. When I speak of knowing God, I have in mind a considerably broader 
notion of knowing than that employed by most epistemologists, who tend 
to think of knowledge as a species of knowing that or having acquaintance 
with an object. The sense of knowing that I have in mind is not easy to ar-
ticulate, but it is probably best described as being in rapport with someone. 
When one is in rapport with another, one does not simply enjoy some sort 
of privileged epistemic contact with that person. One also knows how to 
engage that person and, often, what that person cares about. In this respect, 
the concept of knowing with which I am working belongs more nearly to 
a cluster of virtue-theoretic notions according to which knowing someone 
is not only a mode of understanding but also an achievement, typically 
accomplished only with time, familiarity, effort, and discernment. It goes 
without saying that knowing of this sort is often implicit—one needn’t 
be able to articulate one’s know-how—and acquired by osmosis when 
participating in practices in which such know-how is modeled by others. 
Under this understanding, then, the dictum that knowing God is a spe-
cies of practical knowledge is the claim that knowing God (in the sense 
just specified) consists in (although is not exhausted by) knowing how to 
engage God.9
My project in this paper is to explore the contribution that knowing 
how to engage in ritualized activity plays in knowing God (in the sense 
just specified). Specifically, it is to explore the contribution that knowing 
how to engage in ritualized liturgical activity makes to knowing God (in 
the sense just specified). Engaging in this project will, however, require 
laying some conceptual groundwork. I’ll begin by discussing the notion 
of knowing how, staking out a position on this issue that seems to me 
plausible. I’ll then turn to the ancient Christian liturgies, developing the 
idea that it is by participating in these activities that we acquire and exer-
cise ritual knowledge, which is a type of knowing how. In my judgment, 
it is not helpful to discuss Christian liturgical practices in the abstract. 
So, I shall focus on a liturgical tradition in which the theme of practical 
knowledge of God is especially prominent, namely, the Eastern Christian 
tradition in which figures such as Evagrios and Nyssa developed their 
own views. However, much of what I say about the Eastern liturgies can, I 
believe, be applied to other liturgical traditions in which ritualized forms 
of action are prominent.
It might be worth adding a final observation before diving into our 
topic. When compared to mainline philosophy of religion, my discus-
sion will be thoroughly unorthodox. I will have almost nothing (more) to 
9A word about how I am using the phrase “to engage God.” We engage those around us 
in all manner of ways: by catching their attention, addressing them, and embracing them, 
for example. What these various activities have in common is that, when all goes well, they 
effect mutual recognition. I am using the phrase “to engage God” in a way that analogically 
extends our ordinary understanding of what it is to engage another. It is, when all goes well, 
to effect a state of divine-human mutual recognition. 
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say, for example, about the rationality of religious belief. And I will have 
a good deal to say about various elements of Christian ritual. In these 
respects, my discussion has something in common with the approach 
taken by so-called Wittgensteinian philosophers of religion, who have 
chided philosophers for paying insufficient attention to the fact that the 
religious attitudes are embedded in and have their distinctive roles in re-
ligious ways of life. Still, unlike the Wittgensteinians, I have no interest in 
defending a noncognitivist account of the religious attitudes, according 
to which the religious attitudes fail to express full-fledged beliefs about 
God.10 In my view, the religious attitudes come in a great variety of forms, 
including full-fledged religious belief. It is also my view that full-fledged 
belief needn’t be a component of knowing how to dwell in communion 
with God, but this is a topic that I will broach only at the end of this paper.
I. Knowing How
Suppose Christianity is a way of life, incorporating activities such as 
prayer, fasting, and ritualized activity. If it is, then the thesis that some 
religious knowledge is (to some significant degree) a species of knowing 
how should have immediate appeal. For to engage in a way of life is to 
have a certain kind of competence or know-how. But what is it to know 
how to do something, to engage in those activities that constitute a way 
of life?
In this section, I sketch what seems to me a promising account of what 
it is to know how to do something. For reasons that will become apparent 
soon, I will call this position the moderate view. Roughly stated, the mod-
erate view tells us that to know how to perform some activity Φ ing is to 
stand in a knowing or understanding relation to a way of Φ ing.11
In the next few sections, I will conduct my discussion as if something 
close to the moderate view is correct. Nonetheless, I do not want the gen-
eral project in which I engage—namely, to explore the contribution that 
knowing how to engage in ritualized liturgical activity makes to knowing 
God—to depend on the particularities of the moderate position. So, those 
unsympathetic with the moderate position—say, those who identify 
knowing how with a special sort of knowing that—should feel free to 
attempt to translate what I say into the idioms that belong to their favored 
version of knowing how. Let me also add that, although I will speak as if I 
am unpacking the concept of knowing how, it might be that there are mul-
tiple conceptions of knowing how. Some might be very thin, expressing 
10The most thorough engagement with the Wittgensteinians of which I am aware is 
Wolterstorff, “Are Religious Believers Committed to the Existence of God?” (chap. 13 of his 
Practices of Belief).
11This is the view defended in John Bengson and Marc Moffett, “Nonpropositional Intel-
lectualism,” in Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action, ed. John Bengson and 
Marc Moffett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 161–195. In what follows, I borrow 
liberally from their fine paper. I have also been helped by Alva Noë, “Ideology and the 
Third Realm (Or, a Short Essay on Knowing How to Philosophize),” in Bengson and Moffett 
Knowing How.
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the idea that knowing how to perform an activity is simply a matter of 
being able to perform it. Others might be thicker, expressing the idea that 
knowing how to perform an activity requires a lot more than this, such as 
understanding what one is doing. As will become evident, the moderate 
view expresses a thicker notion of knowing how (although there are ac-
counts that are still thicker). If you prefer to work with a thinner concept 
of knowing how, then think of the moderate view as one that articulates 
a fairly advanced state of knowing how. Finally, I should emphasize that 
my aim is simply to sketch the main features of the moderate view so as 
to have an account of knowing how with which to work. A full presen-
tation of the view would introduce nuances and refinements that I am 
going to ignore.
The Moderate View
The best way to understand the moderate view is to begin with the notion 
of a way of acting. A way of acting is a sequence of act-types that an agent 
can perform. Performing a work of music, swimming the crawl stroke, 
and offering thanks are all ways of acting. If, for example, an agent knows 
how to perform a work of music or offer thanks to God, that agent grasps 
a way of acting that is a way of performing that work of music or thanking 
God. If this is right, knowing how to perform an action is a species of 
objectual knowledge, having as its object not a proposition but a way 
of acting.
The thesis that knowing how is not a species of propositional knowledge 
or knowing that is controversial. Here, however, are several considerations 
in its favor. First, note that when an agent knows a proposition, this rela-
tion can be “upgraded” in certain ways. If you are in excellent epistemic 
position with regard to the proposition that your mother’s maiden name is 
“Smith,” for example, you might say, “I not only know that her maiden 
name is ‘Smith,’ but I’m also certain of it.” Knowing how, by contrast, 
cannot be upgraded in this way. When you know how to engage in an 
activity such as performing John Coltrane’s “Giant Steps,” you wouldn’t 
say, “I not only know how to perform ‘Giant Steps,’ I am also certain of it.” 
This is because when knowing how gets upgraded, it is often upgraded to 
the level of not certainty but mastery. When you are in excellent position 
with regard to performing an activity such that you know how to perform 
it, you would say, “I not only know how to perform ‘Giant Steps,’ but I’ve 
also mastered it.”12
12See Bengson and Moffett, “Nonpropositional Intellectualism,” 184. I say that knowing 
how is “often” upgraded in this way because one could distinguish between excellence in 
knowing how and mastery in knowing how. As I understand this distinction, one has excel-
lence in knowing how to act in some way when one has understood to a sufficiently high 
degree how to act in that way. This is compatible, however, with not being able to act in that 
way. I could, for example, have excellence in knowing how to swim the crawl stroke, since 
I know all its ins and outs, but be too uncoordinated to perform it well. By contrast, one has 
mastery in knowing how when one has excellence in knowing how to act in some way and 
can perform that activity well. 
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A second consideration in favor of the claim that knowing how is objec-
tual is that states of knowing how are not susceptible to Gettier-style cases 
in the way that states of knowing that are. Suppose, for example, I am a 
pianist who wishes to perform “Giant Steps.” I consult a written score 
that I recently purchased, thereby grasping how to play the piece. Sup-
pose, though, that I were extraordinarily lucky to consult this particular 
score, since all other available written scores are defective on account of 
including badly incorrect information regarding how to play the piece, 
such as including the wrong time signature and melody. Although I am 
very lucky to have the correct score, I know how to perform “Giant Steps” 
nonetheless. The fact that I was lucky enough to hit upon the correct score 
seems irrelevant to whether I have come to know how to perform the 
piece. This is in sharp contrast to the standard way in which philosophers 
think of knowing that. When an agent knows that something is the case, 
most philosophers believe, it cannot be due to a fluke, but must have been 
the upshot of a reliable belief-forming process operating in a congenial 
environment.13
These are, I believe, important considerations in favor of the moderate 
view’s thesis that knowing how is not a species of knowing that. Still, 
knowing how to perform some action, such as performing Coltrane’s 
“Giant Steps,” requires more than merely grasping or apprehending that 
way of acting, as an agent’s grasp or understanding of a way of acting can 
be deficient in several important respects.
Consider the following pair of cases. Imagine, first, a case in which I 
have not previously performed “Giant Steps,” but gotten my hands on a 
score of this piece. If my copy of this score is incomplete in important re-
spects, leaving out vital information about how to perform this piece, such 
as how to play its head, then I do not know how to perform it. Although 
there are actions that constitute performing this piece of music, they are 
unavailable to me. Alternatively, imagine a case in which I know how to 
perform some activity, such as playing a chord progression that consists 
in a progression of minor thirds, but I am unaware that performing that 
very activity is a way to perform the chord progression of “Giant Steps.” If 
so, while I grasp a way of acting that is in fact a way to perform this work, 
I do not know how to perform it.
Not all deficiencies, however, are ones in which an agent’s under-
standing of a way of acting is incomplete, as an agent’s grasp of a way 
of acting can be deficient when it incorporates a mistaken understanding 
of how to perform that action. To stay with our example, suppose that I 
have been instructed to perform “Giant Steps” in 6/8 time and in the key 
of C#. Imagine, furthermore, that while I take myself to be doing exactly 
what I have been taught when I perform the piece, I in fact perform it in 
4/4 time and visit several different tonal centers, which is the correct way 
13The case is borrowed from Yuri Cath, “Knowing How Without Knowing That,” in 
Bengson and Moffett, Knowing How.
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to perform the piece. Do I know how to perform the piece? Arguably not. 
I have a mistaken understanding of how to perform it, since I am confused 
about its time signature and key. While I might in fact perform the piece 
correctly, I do not know how to perform it.
If this is right, for an agent to know how to perform some action, that 
agent’s understanding of it must satisfy some threshold of completeness 
and accuracy. What is that threshold? It may be impossible to say. In-
deed, the issue may be context sensitive, as so-called contextualists about 
knowledge claim. However that may be, let me now make several obser-
vations about the moderate view.
First, if knowing how to perform an action requires having a suffi-
ciently complete and accurate understanding of a way of acting, knowing 
how to do something is not simply a matter of being reliably disposed to 
do it, as philosophers such as Gilbert Ryle claimed.14 The moderate view, 
then, is aptly titled, as it implies that knowing how is neither a species of 
knowing that nor a matter of being reliably disposed to act in a certain 
way. For, to say it once again, the moderate view implies that knowing 
how to do something implies having a sufficient degree of understanding 
concerning how to do something. Second, while the moderate view tells 
us that knowing how to perform an activity implies having a certain type 
and degree of understanding of that activity, the view does not imply 
that knowing how to perform an activity implies that one can actually 
perform it. It may be that one can know how to perform “Giant Steps” 
even when one has suffered paralysis. Nor, finally, does the moderate 
view imply that knowing how to perform some activity implies that one 
is able to articulate how to perform it. Knowing how to do something can 
be implicit.
To this point, I have spoken of knowing how to perform relatively dis-
crete actions such as performing the musical work “Giant Steps.” Often, 
however, these ways of acting are embedded in complex social practices, 
such as the social practice of playing jazz piano, which have their own 
histories, standards of excellence, and methods of evaluation. And, often, 
knowing how to perform some activity is part of the larger endeavor of 
learning how to engage in and navigate these social practices. Take, for ex-
ample, the social practice just mentioned, namely, performing jazz piano. 
To be inducted into this practice involves learning not simply how to per-
form various musical works, such as works by Coltrane, but also learning 
how to listen to them—noticing their nuances and differences from one 
another. It involves, moreover, knowing how to interpret musical scores, 
motifs, chord progressions, and rhythmic patterns in such a way that one 
develops a certain degree of facility with performing musical works in the 
genre. Importantly, for my purposes, knowing how to engage in the prac-
tice of performing jazz piano involves knowing not only how to evaluate 
compositions and performances, but also how to engage with works of 
14See Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1949).
374 Faith and Philosophy
music in such a way that one cares about how they are interpreted and 
performed. All this suggests that the best way to talk about the complex 
phenomenon that I am describing is probably not to speak of it as knowing 
how to navigate a social practice, so much as knowing how to navigate 
and inhabit a certain life-world—the world of jazz piano. For the latter way 
of talking has the advantage of conveying the idea that there is a musical 
reality with which one engages when one navigates a social practice.
Let me summarize: knowing how to perform some activity is, ac-
cording to the moderate view, to stand in an understanding relation to a 
way of performing that activity. Knowing how is thus neither a species of 
knowing that nor merely a disposition to perform some action correctly. 
While understanding is crucial to knowing how, it is exceedingly difficult 
to identify some threshold of completeness and correctness that an agent’s 
grasp of a way of acting must satisfy to count as a case of knowing how. 
Finally, the ways of acting that we grasp when we know how to perform 
them are often embedded in complex social practices. Because they are, 
the aim of knowing how is often not simply knowing how to perform 
relatively discrete activities but knowing how to navigate and inhabit a 
certain life-world of which these activities are a part. This last point will 
be important to the discussion of the Christian liturgy, which is my topic 
in the next section.
II. Liturgy
To the untrained eye, the ancient liturgies of the Christian East are a jumble 
of disconnected actions. Were you to observe one for the first time, you 
would see people doing such things as kissing, standing, bowing, pros-
trating, chanting, singing, anointing, processing, praying, kneeling, sensing, 
reading, listening, eating, washing, vesting, crossing themselves, and even 
spitting. With increased exposure, you would also recognize that, in many 
cases, these are not impromptu or improvised but scripted actions.
Call a repeatable sequence of actions that has a narrative structure—
roughly, a proper beginning, middle, and end bound together in certain 
identifiable ways—a narrative event.15 Everything from family dinners to 
works of music are, according to this understanding, narrative events. 
Narrative events often have performance-plans or scripts. And when they 
do, these scripts can issue two rather different types of directives. They can 
prescribe, first, that some narrative event-type is to be performed on some 
regular basis, such as once a year, once a week, or once a day. Second, they 
can prescribe when, during the performance of that narrative event-type, 
which actions are to be performed, by whom, and in what manner. For 
example, a script might prescribe that bells are to be rung at the outset of 
the performance of a musical work.
15Thus understood, the concept of a narrative event is normative. It has appropriate be-
ginnings and endings bound together in the right ways. While I will have to leave discussion 
of the senses of “appropriate” to some other occasion, Noël Carroll, “Narrative Closure,” in 
his Art in Three Dimensions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) is a good place to start. 
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Call a script that issues both sorts of directives a ritual script. In the sense 
I understand it, a ritualized action is one that is prescribed by a ritual script. 
The actions that constitute the liturgies of the Eastern Christian Church are, 
under this account, ritualized. For not only are these liturgies repeatable 
narrative event-types; the scripts that govern them also issue both sorts 
of directives, indicating when these narrative events are to be performed 
and when, during their performance, which actions are to be performed, 
by whom, and in what manner. The script that governs the Liturgy of St. 
John Chrysostom, for example, prescribes that it is to be performed every 
Sunday (and at most once per day by some assembly). It also prescribes 
that when this liturgy is performed, it begins with a Trinitarian blessing. 
Both the performance of the liturgy itself and the various actions that con-
stitute it are, under the account offered, ritualized actions.
The Christian tradition has long stressed the importance of ritualized 
actions. I noted earlier that, at one point, Gregory of Nyssa writes that 
the power of Christianity resides not in its philosophical sophistication 
but in the “participation in mystical symbols and rites.” I have also sug-
gested that there is an important sense in which knowing how to perform 
ritualized activities contributes to knowing God. But how could that be 
so? It is easy enough to see that knowing how to play a certain chord 
progression could positively contribute to knowing how to play a musical 
work, since playing that chord progression might count as playing that 
musical work. But how could knowing how to perform ritualized actions 
such as kissing, prostrating, and eating contribute to knowing God in any 
similar way?
The answer that I will develop comes in several stages. In outline, it tells 
us that the liturgy furnishes both a strikingly wide array of ritual actions 
and ways of understanding them such that, when all goes well, knowing 
how to perform these actions under these ways of understanding contrib-
utes in important ways to knowing God. Since the first stage concerns the 
performance of ritualized actions, let us start with these. I will then go on 
to discuss conceptions of God as they are presented in the liturgy.
Liturgical Actions
At one level of description, the actions that constitute the liturgy, such 
as prostrating, kissing, chanting, and eating, are diverse enough that one 
would be hard-pressed to discern what unites them; they look like a rag-
bag of different activities. At another level, however, these actions are not 
disconnected but unified in a certain way, being the constituents of an 
identifiable pattern. This pattern, which is primarily constituted by the 
activities of blessing, petitioning, and offering thanks to God, is what I 
will refer to as the central pattern of the liturgy. Since the central pattern 
is especially apparent in the eucharistic liturgies of the Eastern church, 
especially those of St. Mark, St. Basil, and St. Chrysostom, let us take a 
closer look at the way it takes shape in them.
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Each of these liturgies begins with the declaration that the Kingdom of 
the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is blessed. After the celebrant declares this, 
the deacon, priest, and people engage in a pattern of call and response. In 
the liturgies of St. Basil and St. Chrysostom, for example, a Deacon offers 
a series of petitions for peace and safety:
For the peace from on high and for the salvation of our souls, let us pray to 
the Lord.
For the peace of the whole world, for the welfare of the holy churches of 
God, and for the union of all, let us pray to the Lord. . . .
For travelers by land, by sea, and by air; for the sick and the suffering, for 
captives and their safety and salvation, let us pray to the Lord. 16
To each of these petitions, the people answer “kyrie eleison” or “Lord, 
Have Mercy.” Having completed this initial series of petitions, the congre-
gation sings Psalm 103 (“Bless the Lord, O my Soul”), which is followed by 
a petition for deliverance. This, in turn, is followed by the singing of Psalm 
143 (“Praise the Lord, O my Soul”). Although punctuated by the reading 
of the scriptures, the commemoration of the saints, and various prayers of 
repentance, this pattern of petitioning and blessing continues throughout 
the liturgy, segueing into a sequence of actions in which the people offer 
thanks to God, which itself culminates in the action of eating together. In 
its structure, the analogue that comes to mind is that of a work of music, 
such as a rondo. Much like a rondo, the liturgy introduces themes—and 
variations on themes—in an alternating structure, punctuating them at 
certain points with still other themes. (Perhaps there is another sense in 
which the liturgy is the work of the people!)
It is tempting for philosophers to think of activities such as blessing, 
petitioning, and offering thanks to God as things that we primarily do 
with words. But in this case the temptation must be resisted. While the 
liturgical script prescribes the performance of linguistic acts that count 
as blessing, petitioning, and thanking, it also prescribes actions such as 
kissing, prostrating, and eating. Actions of these latter sorts do not merely 
accompany the linguistic acts prescribed by the liturgical script, as if their 
function were merely to add emphasis to these linguistic acts. Rather, in 
the context of the liturgy, the kissing, prostrating, and eating also count as 
cases of engaging God by blessing, petitioning, and thanking God. In fact, 
these bodily actions are vivid cases of act-types by which a person can 
simultaneously perform multiple actions with expressive import without 
saying a thing. In the context of the liturgy, for example, prostrating is 
often simultaneously an act of petitioning, repenting, blessing, and 
offering thanks. Likewise, in the context of the liturgy, kissing is often si-
multaneously an act of greeting, blessing, adoring, and thanking. I should 
16I am using the translation of the Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom found in Thyateira, 
The Divine Liturgy of our Father Among the Saints John Chrysostom (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995). 
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add that the act of eating, which stands at the center of all the eucharistic 
liturgies, is understood to be not simply one expression of thanksgiving 
among others. Rather, it is understood to be the paradigmic case of ex-
pressing thanks to God.
The central pattern of the liturgy, I have said, is constituted by acts 
of blessing, petitioning, and thanking God. Actions such as these have 
expressive import, since their function is not to state propositions but to 
express respect, affection, gratitude, and the like. Let me make a pair of 
observations about actions with expressive import.
The first is that there is no type of mental state such that for an agent 
to successfully perform an action with expressive import, that agent must 
be in that mental state. Thanking, when all goes well, expresses gratitude. 
But to thank someone at some time, one needn’t be feeling gratitude at 
that time. Honoring, when all goes well, expresses respect. But to honor 
another at some time, one needn’t have any thoughts to the effect that the 
recipient of one’s action has worth of one or another sort.17
Call that which is expressed by the competent performance of an action 
with expressive import, its expressive content.18 The second point I would 
like to make is that the expressive content of an action can be evaluated 
along different dimensions of fittingness. Consider thanking, for example. 
Suppose I write you a note thanking you for a gift that you have given me. 
If the writing of this note is accompanied by feelings of gratitude toward 
you, the expressive content of my action perfectly fits the mental state I 
am in when I write the note. As such, the performance of my action is 
especially apt.
Things might be otherwise, however. I might write the note while 
being deeply resentful toward you. If I do, then my action’s expressive 
content fails to fit the mental state I am in when I write the note. It is 
thus an especially inapt or defective case of thanking. Between the two 
extremes of feeling gratitude and resentment are, of course, various other 
grades of aptness. Thanking can be done absent-mindedly, mechanically, 
reluctantly, indifferently, or with one’s focus entirely on performing the 
action well, such as when one focuses on what words to say because 
choosing them carefully matters a great deal. When agents are in these 
mental states, these actions can be more or less apt. Especially important 
for my purposes is the observation that actions with expressive import 
can enjoy high degrees of fittingness even when the expressive content of 
those actions fails to fit the mental states of the agents who perform them. 
I might, for example, form and reliably execute the resolution to write 
17What about the state of intending to perform an action of that sort? Isn’t that a mental 
state one must be in to perform an act of the relevant kind? Perhaps, but I doubt it. I hint at 
why at the outset of the next section. 
18Philosophers often distinguish between the semantic content of the performance of a 
speech act (roughly, what is said, its propositional content) and what is pragmatically con-
veyed (information not contained in what is said but conveyed nonetheless). I use the phrase 
“expressive content” to capture both sorts of content. 
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your family a thank you note every year because of some great kindness 
they performed toward my family before I was alive. But I may often fail 
to feel gratitude when I write them; their actions may seem so remote in 
time that they fail to engage me emotionally. Still, arguably, my actions of 
thanking are highly apt. They are not apt because their expressive content 
fits the mental state I am in when I write these notes. Rather, they are apt 
because they are appropriate responses to what you have done on my 
family’s behalf, which flows from a state of being resolved to express my 
family’s gratitude.
The first thing to notice about the eucharistic liturgies, then, is that they 
make available a vast array of actions by which—and a context in which—
we can do such things as bless, petition, and offer thanks to God—actions 
that can be assessed along various dimensions of fittingness.
Liturgical Images
It is one thing to perform an action that counts as expressing thanks; it 
is another to know how to do so. In the context of the Eastern liturgies, 
small children perform actions such as kissing a copy of the Gospels and 
eating the eucharistic meal. Arguably, in that context, their actions count 
as cases of offering thanks to God. But these children do not know how 
to thank God by doing such things as kissing a copy of the Gospels. It is 
noteworthy, then, that the actions that constitute the liturgy do not stand 
alone. The liturgical script furnishes an equally wide array of images for 
thinking about or conceiving of God and God’s activity that are connected 
with these actions—images that often pull against one another in puzzling 
and striking ways. Here is a sample.
Just prior to the Trinitarian blessing that begins the eucharistic litur-
gies, the celebrant offers the Trisagion prayers. These prayers, which are 
a rare instance of a prayer whose primary addressee is the Holy Spirit, 
begin with the invocation:
O heavenly King, the Comforter, the Spirit of Truth, who is everywhere, 
filling all things; Treasury of Good and Giver of Life, come and dwell in us, 
cleanse us from every stain, and save us, O Good One. (Liturgy of St. John 
Chrysostom)
This fairly abstract presentation of God as the One Who Fills All Things 
is given an even more pronounced expression in the Anaphora (“the 
lifting up”), which occurs immediately prior to the eucharistic meal. In 
the Anaphora, the assembled address God in the following way:
It is right and fitting to hymn you, to bless you, to praise you, to give thanks 
to you, and to worship you in every place of your dominion: for you are 
God ineffable, inconceivable, invisible, incomprehensible, ever existing and 
eternally the same.
This is apophaticism in high gear. God is addressed as the utterly 
Transcendent One. Yet the liturgical script repeatedly juxtaposes these 
descriptions with a very different set of images that presents God as the 
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Immanent One, “the lover of humankind” who has acted in history. For 
example, soon after addressing God using the description quoted above, 
the assembled address God as the “Helper of the helpless, the Hope of 
the hopeless, the Saviour of the storm-tossed, the Haven of the voyager, 
the Healer of the sick.” The One who “did not turn away” from Creation, 
Ruler of Heaven and Earth, Author of Life, Conqueror of Death, The One 
Who Holds All Things Together—the list of images of God in the liturgical 
script continues on and on.
A moment ago, I noted that the liturgies make available a vast array 
of actions by which (and a context in which) we can do such things as 
petition, bless, and express thanks to God. I now want to emphasize that 
they furnish not only these act-types and contexts, but also a rich array of 
conceptions regarding God and God’s activity that agents can incorporate 
into a “mental file”—this being, roughly, a system of conceptions that an 
agent has with respect to an object, a repository of information that an 
agent takes to be about it, some items of which play a dominant role in an 
agent’s thinking about it. These informational components allow agents 
not simply to think of God and God’s activity in various ways, but also to 
perform liturgical actions such as chanting the Psalms, kissing a copy of 
the Gospels, or eating the eucharistic meal under these conceptions. Think 
of things this way: these conceptions provide specific ways of thinking 
about God and God’s activity such as the One Who Delivers, the One Who 
Fills All Things, and the One who “did not cease to do all things on our 
behalf” (Liturgy of St. Basil). When all goes well, these conceptions of God 
are incorporated into complex action-conceptions. When they are, agents 
conceptualize act-types such as prostrating before an icon of Christ as a 
case of petitioning the One Who Delivers, blessing the One Who Fills All 
Things, and thanking the One who “did not cease to do all things on our 
behalf.” In this way, the grasp and employment of these complex-action 
conceptions guides liturgical action.
There is a great deal of controversy over how to think about how the 
term “God” functions in religious discourse in the monotheistic tradi-
tions—whether, for example, it functions as a proper name or a cluster of 
definite descriptions. One view, which is defended by Mark Johnston, is 
that the name functions as an abbreviated title: The One from Whom Our 
Salvation Flows.19 If Johnston is right about this, then one could think of 
19See Mark Johnston, Saving God (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), chap. 1. 
I should add that I find Johnston’s case that “God” does not function as a proper name un-
convincing. Johnston writes: “In the scriptures, no one actually turns up and says anything 
like ‘I am to be called by the name “God.”’ No one says anything like ‘I hereby introduce 
the name “God” as the name of THIS very impressive being.’ There is no original dubbing 
someone or something as ‘God,’ a dubbing we can hope to fall back on” (6). But it is highly 
controversial that such dubbings are necessary for a term to function as a proper name. 
Moreover, one would have to have an extraordinarily pinched understanding of how the 
scriptures function in the theistic traditions to infer that, since the scriptures do not contain 
a record of any such episode, the best way to understand the scriptural talk of God is that 
there has been no such episode. 
380 Faith and Philosophy
the various conceptions of God presented by the liturgical script as speci-
fications of this title or name, indicating ways in which God is the highest 
one or ways in which God has acted as the agent of salvation. Under this 
way of thinking, the conceptions of God presented in the liturgy, while 
incredibly diverse, are united (in part) by the fact that they are specifica-
tions of or variations on this title—the title itself being an abbreviated way 
of thinking about God’s role in the Christian salvation narrative.
Let me summarize the line of thought that I have developed in this 
section. The Eastern eucharistic liturgies, I have claimed, are constituted 
by a vast array of scripted or ritualized actions, such as chanting Psalms, 
kissing a copy of the Gospels, and eating together. Is there anything that 
unifies them? Yes, these ritualized actions, I have claimed, are all ways in 
which participants in the liturgy engage God by actualizing the central 
pattern of the liturgy of blessing, petitioning, and offering thanks to God. 
In addition to prescribing actions such as these, the liturgical script pres-
ents a vast array of ways of thinking about God and God’s activity, which 
appear no more unified than the actions that constitute the liturgy. Is there 
anything that unifies them? Yes, these images are the components of an 
overarching narrative regarding God and God’s salvific activity, which 
is itself presented in the liturgies and perhaps encapsulated in the title 
“God.” When competently employed, these conceptions allow an agent to 
perform actions such as prostrating, kissing, and eating as ways of inten-
tionally enacting the central pattern of blessing, petitioning, and thanking 
God as the One Who Has Acted on Our Behalf.
The fundamental contribution of the liturgy, then, is to provide act-types 
and conceptions of God such that by performing those act-types under 
those conceptions one can engage God by doing such things as blessing, 
petitioning, and thanking God. In a moment, I will explain why this is 
important for knowing God. For now, let me return to a point made earlier, 
namely that learning how to perform certain actions is often not simply to 
gain facility at performing them. Rather, it is to learn how to navigate and 
inhabit a certain life-world in which those actions have their home. This 
is no less true of performing those ritualized actions that constitute the 
liturgy than it is of performing those actions that are cases of performing 
works of music. It is worth elaborating upon this observation, since to fail 
to do so would be to fail to take us to the heart of liturgical action.
At various points, I have drawn attention to the fact that liturgical ac-
tion is not primarily a series of mental actions such as thinking certain 
thoughts or manufacturing certain feelings at certain times. Rather it is 
thoroughly bodily, involving actions such as bowing, kissing, and eating, 
which are oriented toward one’s physical surroundings. In many cases, 
these physical surroundings are utterly ordinary: they include metal, 
wood, bread, wine, and water. Why, then, in the context of worship, would 
the liturgical script direct those who participate in the liturgy to orient 
themselves toward these materials by doing such things as kissing them?
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Here the liturgical scripts themselves are instructive. Consider the fol-
lowing bit of Byzantine theological poetry, which the celebrant recites 
during the Theophany or the blessing of the waters:
Today the grace of the Holy Spirit has descended on the waters in the like-
ness of a dove.
Today has shone the sun that does not set, and the world is lighted by the 
light of the Lord.
Today the moon shines with the world in its radiating beams.
Today the shining stars adorn the universe with the splendor of their radi-
ance.
Today the clouds of heaven moisten humankind with showers of justice . . . .
Today the waters of the Jordan are changed to healing by the presence of 
the Lord.
This series of proclamations is remarkable if only because it forcefully 
presents the idea that, although we may in the context of the liturgy regu-
larly engage with ordinary matter such as water, this matter is really not 
so ordinary. And, so, in the liturgical context, it is not treated as ordinary 
stuff but is the object of blessing, the vehicle of blessing, and the subject 
of poetry. (In the rite of the Theophany, the people not only bless, but 
are also blessed with the water by the celebrant.) In effect, the liturgical 
script of the Theophany prods those assembled to understand the salva-
tion narrative that lies at the core of Christianity expansively. Not only 
is humankind being restored by the actions of God in time, but so also is 
matter, inasmuch as it too has become a means of God’s presence, a source 
or point of contact with God. Indeed, as the Trisagion prayers illustrate, a 
prominent theme in Eastern Christianity is the omnipresence of God. God 
is the One Who Fills All Things, permeating the world with the divine 
energies. Because of this, some have described the tradition as advocating 
a version of panentheism.20 However that may be, the tradition maintains 
that the relation between God and matter is intimate—so intimate, in fact, 
that to engage with matter is to engage with God.
The upshot is that ritualized activity such as the blessing of the waters 
has the effect, when things go moderately well, of honing one’s sensibili-
ties in such a way that one begins to view, experience, and treat matter 
differently than one would in one’s day-to-day life. The analogue with 
music with which I have been working is, I believe, helpful in this respect. 
Being introduced to the performance of a musical work often has the effect 
of expanding one’s ears, allowing one to hear things differently than one 
did in the past. Often, moreover, the expansion does not come easily to the 
listener; only with significant and repeated exposure on the listener’s part 
20Kallistos Ware, “God Immanent yet Transcendent: The Divine Energies according to 
Saint Gregory Palamas,” in In Whom We Live and Move and Have Our Being, ed. Philip Clayton 
and Arthur Peacocke (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004), 157–168 discusses the issue.
382 Faith and Philosophy
does she begin to hear sounds differently, make connections with music 
with which she is familiar, and value these new types and sequences of 
sounds. Indeed, such exposure is often not enough. Sometimes the expan-
sion occurs only with significant work on the listener’s part, which might 
include intently focusing on the sounds and seeking ways to understand 
them, such as trying to understand their mathematical relations. These 
activities are part of immersing oneself in the life-world of musical perfor-
mance and listening. The parallel with engaging in liturgical action and 
immersing oneself in the life-world of the Christian narrative, I trust, is 
obvious. A central aim of immersing oneself in liturgical action is often to 
alter one’s sensibilities. Often, moreover, this process requires repeated 
exposure and effort; it can be difficult to achieve.
III. Ritual Knowledge
There is a famous passage in the Pensées in which Pascal offers advice to 
those who have been persuaded that it is prudentially rational to accept 
that God exists. If you want to believe, says Pascal, then go do things. 
In particular, engage in liturgical actions such as taking holy water and 
attending mass. The natural interpretation of Pascal’s advice is that 
engaging in these activities is the sort of thing that will increase the likeli-
hood of coming to believe that God exists; the activities are simply the 
means to achieve this desirable cognitive state. But another interpretation 
of Pascal’s advice is available, which is that engaging in the liturgical 
activities he mentions is not primarily a means to forming beliefs about 
God but that knowing God (in something like the virtue-theoretic sense 
identified earlier) consists in engaging in them.
This interpretation approximates the thesis that I have been interested 
in developing. But now it is time to pull together the strands of our dis-
cussion. To that end, let us begin with the conviction that has animated 
our discussion, which is that our thinking about the religious attitudes 
should be guided by the observation that Christianity is a way of life. This 
observation has not in fact guided the contemporary discussion of the 
epistemology of the religious attitudes. And because it has not, I have sug-
gested, this discussion has threatened to produce a distorted picture of the 
nature and roles of the religious attitudes and, more generally, religious 
life “on the ground”—a picture in which the practical dimensions of reli-
gious life drop out. If, however, the Christian way of life is fundamentally 
practical in its orientation, it is natural to inquire: What would it be to 
engage in this way of life, to know how to engage in its central activities, 
such as thanking God?
The moderate view of knowing how can help to answer this question. It 
helps us to understand what it is to know how to do something—knowing 
how, if the view is correct, consisting in the understanding of not proposi-
tions but ways of acting. Still, the moderate view gives us only an abstract 
account of what it is to know how to do something. We also want to 
know what it is to know how to perform those actions that are central to 
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the Christian way of life, such as engaging God by doing such things as 
blessing, petitioning, and thanking God.
To address these questions, I have suggested, we should look more 
closely at Christian liturgical practice, which is a central component of 
the Christian way of life. Using the Eastern Christian liturgies as our focal 
point, we saw that the contribution of the liturgy to engaging God is two-
fold. First, the liturgy makes available act-types of a certain range such 
as chanting, kissing, prostrating, and eating that count in the context of 
a liturgical performance as cases of blessing, petitioning, and thanking 
God—these last act-types constituting what I have called the central 
pattern of the liturgy. And, second, the liturgy furnishes an array of con-
ceptions of God and God’s activity under which to perform actions such 
as chanting, kissing, prostrating, and eating. When all goes well, these 
conceptions guide one’s performance of these actions by being the com-
ponents of complex action-conceptions in which the assembled do such 
things as petition God as The One Who Delivers, bless God as the One 
Who Fills All Things, and thank God as the One who “did not cease to do 
all things on our behalf.”
If this is correct, the liturgy provides the materials for not only engaging 
but also knowing how to engage God. Or more precisely: the liturgy pro-
vides the materials by which a person can acquire such knowledge and a 
context in which she can exercise or enact it. For if one grasps these ways 
of acting in such a way that one understands them to be ways of blessing, 
petitioning, and thanking God, then one knows how to engage God by 
performing actions such as blessing, petitioning, and thanking God. Or 
more precisely yet: to the extent that one grasps and sufficiently under-
stands these ways of acting, one knows how to bless, petition, and thank 
God in their ritualized forms. One has ritual knowledge.
A further nuance is worth noting. There are, I have claimed, many ways 
to do such things as bless, petition, and thank. Suppose I ask you to pass 
the salt when eating dinner together. I could do that by writing a formal 
request. Or suppose I thank you for writing a letter of recommendation. 
I could do that by slapping you hard on the back, despite your suffering 
from a degenerative back condition. These actions could even be expres-
sions of practical knowledge, since I can understand them to be ways of 
petitioning and thanking. But they are egregiously inapt ways of acting. 
The liturgical script, interestingly, repeatedly draws attention to the fact 
that the ways of acting that it prescribes are not inapt. Mostly this is done 
by noting that the sacrifice offered to God in the liturgy consists not in 
shedding blood but rather in praising God and that the bowing that oc-
curs is not to “flesh and blood” but to God, the Ruler of All (Liturgy of St. 
John Chrysostom). If the liturgical script’s assessment of the very actions 
it prescribes is correct, the liturgy furnishes not simply ways of acting that 
are ways of engaging God, but also ways of acting that are apt ways of 
engaging God. Ritual knowledge, when all goes well, is knowing how to 
engage God in ways that are fitting.
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Let me now draw out some implications of our discussion. One impli-
cation is that the conditions for knowing how to engage God are, in one 
regard, demanding, as an agent’s knowing how to perform an action such 
as thanking God requires that there be a way of acting such that (i) that 
agent can engage in that way of acting with respect to the being who is 
God (if any such being exists) (ii) that way of acting counts as thanking 
God and (iii) that agent has a sufficiently complete and accurate under-
standing of that way of acting. Given the ontological distance between us 
and God to which the liturgy draws our attention, achieving this sort of 
know-how would not be a trivial matter.
But, as I indicated earlier, there are also respects in which the conditions 
for knowing how to perform such actions as thanking God are consider-
ably less demanding than the conditions for knowing various propositions 
about God. One such respect concerns the role of belief. Imagine that you 
are a high-level theoretical physicist who suspects that there is a type 
of subatomic particle—hitherto undiscovered—that is responsible for 
various happenings in the quantum world. You devise various types of 
experiments to determine whether there is such a particle. The evidence 
that there is such a particle is promising but not decisive; consequently, 
you do not find yourself believing that such a particle exists. Still, when 
you devise and conduct your experiments, you act on the assumption 
that it does exist and proceed with your work on this assumption. Sup-
pose, for argument’s sake, that the particle does exist and has many of the 
properties that you suppose it has. Do you know how to do such things 
as discover it, manipulate it in various ways, and make evident its prop-
erties? Presumably, yes. For to have the relevant sort of know-how, you 
must have a sufficiently comprehensive and accurate understanding of 
how to manipulate the relevant particle. And, by hypothesis, you have 
that. To have the relevant sort of know-how, though, you do not have to 
believe (and, hence, know) that the object of your actions exists. In this 
regard, there is a crucial difference between knowing that and knowing 
how. If this is so, then one can understand why certain strains of Chris-
tianity have placed emphasis on knowing how to engage God by doing 
such things as blessing and thanking God rather than being in or trying to 
manufacture certain doxastic states. The relevant sort of knowledge how 
does not require being in these doxastic states.
Still, under the standard interpretation, figures such as Pascal have 
been especially concerned that their interlocutors form religious beliefs. 
The contemporary discussion of the religious attitudes, likewise, has been 
almost exclusively focused on the epistemic status of these beliefs, as if 
being in this type of state holds a special prominence in the Christian 
way of life. I have been suggesting that this tendency threatens to offer 
a distorted picture of the religious life, as this way of life is fundamen-
tally concerned not so much with being in this type of doxastic state with 
respect to propositions about God as with conducting oneself in certain 
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ways with respect to God that count as engaging God, and knowing how 
to conduct oneself in those ways.
Suppose that one were to grant the point. A satisfactory account of the 
religious attitudes, you agree, would have to pay considerably more atten-
tion to their practical dimensions. It is still natural to wonder what is so 
special about those actions on which I have focused—those that constitute 
the central pattern of the liturgy. Why does their performance deserve a 
type of priority in the religious life, as the Eastern tradition holds?
The narrative that lies at the heart of the Christian way of life, I believe, 
points toward an answer to this question. At the heart of this narrative is a 
story of falling away, one that is wrapped in images of dust, fruit, reptiles, 
and nakedness. The story of falling away describes how it is that human 
beings have come to be at such deep variance with God and each other. 
In the Christian tradition, both the origin and the nature of this state are 
often presented in terms of disobedience—specifically, being in a state of 
disobedience with regard to God. In the narrative of salvation history in 
St. Basil’s liturgy, for example, it is described along these lines.
But this is not the only or arguably the most penetrating way to under-
stand the nature of the rupture. In his book For the Life of the World, the 
Orthodox theologian Alexander Schmemann writes that the falling away 
is not so much the result of disobedience as the consequence of living 
a “noneucharistic life in a noneucharistic world.”21 “Not giving thanks,” 
writes Schmemann is the “‘vital essence’ of evil . . . the sin that tore” 
human beings “from God.”22 If Schmemann’s diagnosis is correct, it holds 
the key to understanding why it is that enacting the central pattern of the 
liturgy enjoys such prominence in the Christian way of life: it is how we 
repair the rupture. For in knowing how to do such things as bless, peti-
tion, and thank God, one thereby knows how to engage God in such a way 
that one can know God in the sense of knowing how to live in communion 
or be in rapport with God. That, I believe, is where the importance of ritual 
knowledge lies.23
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